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Politics has given “social welfare” a bad name. In a year featuring important 
election-year debates over a great recession, health care coverage, fiscal austerity, and, 
well, “social welfare,” six of the top ten New York Times stories of 2012 containing that 
term concerned campaign spending from undisclosed funding sources
1
. The juxtaposition of 
social welfare and dark money is unfortunate beyond semantics. It reflects a broader 
confusion between tax law and election law, as well as between federal and state regulation. 
For decades, Congress has tried and failed to legislate a coherent regime for the tax 
exemption and disclosure of political contributions and expenditures. From 501(c)(4) 
organizations to 527 organizations and back again, and from soft money to PACs to 
independent expenditures, federal law continually channels and rechannels essentially fluid 
political activity through a series of leaky regulations administered by ineffective 
enforcement agencies. Meanwhile, at a time when the vast majority of Americans find it 
increasingly difficult to make their voices heard and dollars count in politics, the regulatory 
complexity of organized political participation is that of the tax code squared by campaign 
finance law. 
More productively, the juxtaposition of the nonprofit and the political also serves as 
a reminder of an important issue generally overlooked in national campaign finance 
debates. Political organizations are, and should be, nonprofit organizations. As such, they 
are governed by a body of law more fundamental than either the tax code or campaign 
finance regulation: the traditional duty of the states, typically state attorneys general, to 
supervise nonprofit organizations. In the realm of charity regulation, state attorneys general 
have the power to hold organizations accountable to the public to which they owe their 
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privileged tax and organizational status, and to their members and donors to whom they 
owe their funding. Similar state interests in  accountability  apply  to  noncharitable  
political  nonprofit organizations. Indeed, those basic state legal interests fairly can be said 
to lay the foundation for the federal tax and campaign finance regulatory superstructure 
that is the locus of most policymaking in the law of politics. State attorneys general 
therefore have a fundamental role to play in improving the accountability of political 
organizations, and have the power to do so. That role is increasingly important as federal 
regulatory failures in tax and campaign finance law blur the distinctions between political 
organizations and other nonprofit social welfare and even charitable organizations. Not 
only do contributors and the public rely on effective policing of nonprofit political activity, 
but nonprofits themselves should want a legal regime under which they can credibly 
disclaim to their donors certain political activities, while safely advocating their 
organizational mission through less direct means of political influence. 
This paper explores the relationship between federal tax and campaign finance 
regulation, and state nonprofit supervision, of political organizations.  “Political  
organizations,”  for  these  purposes,  means  an organization regardless of its tax or 
campaign finance status that solicits and spends money to influence elections, directly or 
indirectly.
2
 Part I considers the similarities between the accountability means and ends of 
nonprofit supervision for political organizations, and campaign finance regulation of those 
same organizations. Part II compares the institutional structures of federal tax and 
campaign finance regulation with that of state nonprofit supervision. It argues that state 
institutions, particularly state attorneys general, can be more effective at achieving the 
shared accountability ends of nonprofit and campaign finance regulation than federal 
institutions, particularly the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Election Commission. 
The conclusion examines a recent example of state nonprofit supervision in the service of 
political organization accountability, and suggests how it and other innovations at the state 
level might best contribute to a distinct form of political organization accountability. 
 
 
I. THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AS NONPROFITS  
 
Political organizations are, and should be, nonprofit  organizations. Political 
organizations receive most of their income through member dues or private donations. 
They work to influence elections on behalf of, rather than distribute profits to, their 
members. Their output is therefore influence, which can be particularly difficult to measure, 
at least until after the election. Influence also is a public good because the producer cannot 
easily exclude anyone from its impact. Finally, and not insignificantly, political 
organizations’ ultimate purpose is, at least in the eyes of their members, the promotion of 
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social welfare. All of these features shared by political organizations also distinguish 
nonprofits from business organizations. The key structural feature of nonprofits that serves 
this distinction is the duty of general or  “public,”  rather  than  private,  benefit  enforced  
through  a prohibition on payment of dividends, the nondistribution constraint.
3
 
State law imposes the nondistribution constraint on nonprofit organizations, most 
commonly through the corporate charter. Political organizations are nonprofit 
organizations under state law first, and tax- exempt entities under federal law second. 
Political parties and candidate campaigns often incorporate as nonprofit corporations, as 
do independent advocacy groups. The corporate form confers general organizational 
advantages like perpetual life and, to a lesser extent, limited liability, that facilitate 
amassing and deploying resources for political activities. More broadly, the corporate 
form establishes an agency relationship between an organization’s management and its 
funders that aligns their interests. Fiduciary duties of care and loyalty do some of this 
accountability work. Beyond those duties, in political organizations where contributors are 
members or donors who do not necessarily have voting rights or other direct control of 
management, a legal constraint against the distribution of dividends further assures 
funders that their money will support shared political goals rather than personal 
inurement. So political organizations that incorporate opt for the nonprofit form. 
State and federal governments confer a variety of special privileges on nonprofit 
corporations to encourage their development in the absence of a profit motive. Most 
importantly, federal tax law subsidizes the nonprofit corporate form through an income 
tax exemption, providing an additional incentive for political organizations to 
incorporate.  So that  this  fiscal incentive is not wasted or misdirected, Congress has 
drawn boundaries around tax-exempt nonprofit political activity.
4 
A traditional charity 
under section 501(c)(3), eligible for tax-deductible contributions along with the income 
tax exemption, may not have as a “substantial part” of its activities “carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation,” with some exceptions, and 
may not “participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), any political campaign  on  behalf  of  (or  in  opposition  to)  any  candidate  
for  public office.”5   Social  welfare  organizations  under  section  501(c)(4)  must  be 
“primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of 
the people of the community,”6 a purpose that regulations construe to exclude any 
primary purpose that includes “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political 
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.”7 The IRS 
General Counsel later extended the primary purpose test to labor organizations under 
section 501(c)(5), and trade organizations under section 501(c)(6).
8 
Finally, federal tax law 
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provides directly for a tax-exempt “political organization” under section 527, “organized 
and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or 
making expenditures” to influence candidate campaigns.9 State tax law looks to federal 
tax status for the purpose of determining state tax privileges. 
In exchange for the associated privileges of corporate status and tax exemption, the 
state and federal legal regimes governing the nonprofit organization demand two kinds of 
accountability. First, the organization must be accountable to the public, who confer tax and 
other privileges through their government only to the extent the organization returns the 
broader public benefits subsidized through the nonprofit form. The primary means of public 
accountability for nonprofit organizations under nonprofit and tax law, disclosure, is similar 
to the primary means of campaign finance regulation (at least after Citizens United and 
associated deregulation of campaign expenditures). Second, the organization must be 
accountable to its members and donors, who contribute only to the extent the organization’s 
goals are credibly aligned with their own. Donor accountability through fiduciary and 
solicitation law, a primary concern of nonprofit law, is less developed as a concern of 
campaign finance regulation. 
A. Accountability to the Public 
Long after states limited the purposes for which organizations can incorporate, 
nearly all states retain a special nonprofit corporate form provided by statute.
10   
That form 
enables a political organization to signal its adherence to the nondistribution constraint 
and thereby encourage contributions. Federal and state tax laws provide tax exemptions 
for nonprofit organizations. In return for these privileges as nonprofits, political 
organizations must limit their activities and, in so many words, act like nonprofits. 
State corporate law mainly imposes formal limits such as the prohibition on paying 
dividends and, relatedly, heightened fiduciary duties and conflict of interest standards 
relative to business corporations. Under the policy against the deductibility of political 
(as opposed to business or charitable) expenditures, federal tax law keeps political 
organizations from acting too much like businesses through the anti-inurement provisions 
on the one hand, and keeps charities from acting too much like political organizations 
through the political activity limits on the other hand. 
The primary form of political organizations’ accountability to the public under 
nonprofit law is financial disclosure through means such as the federal Form 990 and state 
registration laws. Disclosure also is a central tool in campaign finance regulation, but the 
primary concern of disclosure under nonprofit law is disclosure of expenditures made 
while the primary concern of disclosure under campaign finance law is disclosure of 
contributions received. The public accountability of a nonprofit corporation requires that it 
disclose to the public its expenditures to allow the public to verify how they are consistent 
with its nonprofit status (e.g., appropriate programs, no inurement, limited or no political 
activity), whereas campaign finance requires that a political organization disclose to the 
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public its contributions to allow the public to verify who is funding its political expenditures 
(also disclosed). Although the experience of section 527 in operation has been 
disappointing, the logic of that law in enforcing the distinction between nonprofit and 
political activities for disclosure purposes is sound. Basically, section 527 holds that 
political organizations’ political activities are tax exempt if, and only if, they are disclosed. 
In doing so, the law attempts to distinguish political organizations, which are subject to this 
general public policy of donor disclosure, from tax-exempt charities and non-exempt 
businesses, which are not. 
Charity donors and members, as well as donors to and members of traditional 
social welfare organizations that do not participate in political activities, are generally 
exempt from a policy of disclosure as a matter of associational freedom recognized in 
statute and constitutional doctrine. Tax law distinguishes charities from political 
organizations with the political activity prohibitions, one of the few bright lines drawn in 
this area of tax policy that has remained effective in the test of time. Business shareholders 
and patrons, while they may be disclosed through other corporate and securities law, are 
not typical subjects of a policy of political disclosure because even when a business 
corporation makes political expenditures its funding is not necessarily informative of its 
funders’ political interests.11 Tax law distinguishes businesses from political organizations 
with the anti- inurement provisions. 
Campaign finance law, properly conceived, draws the same lines between charity 
and political nonprofit organizations, and those organizations and businesses, for 
disclosure purposes. Yet, as the experience of 501(c)(4) organizations and section 527 
itself demonstrates, bright lines are elusive. In particular, federal regulators’ failure to 
find a workable threshold for when political activity becomes a nonprofit’s primary 
purpose under tax law, or major purpose under campaign finance law, opened a gaping 
loophole in the disclosure regime for noncharitable exempt organizations under tax law 
and for non-PAC political organizations under campaign finance law. Going forward, one 
question is whether state nonprofit supervision can help clarify or reinforce that distinction 
for disclosure and related purposes of public accountability. 
B. Accountability to Donors 
The most familiar role of states in nonprofit regulation is in ensuring 
accountability to donors. The state attorney general’s powers to supervise nonprofit 
organizations is rooted in ancient charitable trust doctrine, and confirmed by modern 
statutes or judicial decisions in every state.
12  
These powers include the traditional 
enforcement of fiduciary duties to ensure the careful and loyal execution of donor intent, 
and more recent registration and disclosure laws that take a consumer protection approach 
to facilitate informed   giving   by   individuals   at   the   solicitation   stage.   Donor 
accountability is not a primary concern of campaign finance regulation, but political 
organizations as nonprofits similarly depend on donor trust that contributions will be 
used to further the organization’s political purposes. Conversely, donors to charities and 
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nonprofit organizations that cannot engage in political activity, or represent to their donors 
they will not engage in political activity, need to trust that such organization will abstain 
from politics. 
At their core, fiduciary duty and solicitation laws address charities already prohibited 
from political activity as a matter of their federal 501(c)(3) status. Compliance with the 
narrow boilerplate requirements of the federal organizational test can, in the case of 
501(c)(3) organizations, provide states grounds to enforce broader fiduciary duties invoked 
by that boilerplate, for example.
13
 But the basic nonprofit governance principles extend 
beyond sections 501(c)(3) to 501(c)(4), both of which share anti- inurement provisions that 
allows tax-exempt status on the condition that “no part of the net earnings of such entity 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”14 Although section 527 does 
not discuss inurement as such, it does presume that amounts “diverted for the personal use 
of the candidate or any other person” will be treated as taxable income.15 While these 
provisions reinforce a nonprofit corporation’s duty to serve public (or at least political) 
rather than private benefit as a matter of accountability to the public,
16
 they also parallel a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation as a matter of accountability to donors. 
State nonprofit law typically casts a wider net than federal tax law, and that net also 
includes at least some categories of political activity even within  the  common  law  
definition  of  charity.
17
   The  Revised  Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, for example, 
provides for the incorporation of a “public benefit corporation” for “the purpose of engaging 
in any lawful activity.”18 Any organization incorporated under that status is subject to the 
nondistribution   constraint   and   attorney   general   supervision   powers, regardless of its 
political activities.
19 
Charitable solicitation laws also sweep political activities within the 
state definitions of charity that are typically broader than 501(c)(3). In an implicit 
recognition of this, many states partially or fully exempt political fundraising from their 
charitable registration statutes,
20 
based on an expectation that political organizations will 
file properly under campaign finance laws.
21 
To the extent they apply, both the fiduciary 
duty enforcement and solicitation regulation powers of the state may have particularly 
useful, but relatively unexplored, functions for political organizations. 
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The role of fiduciary duties in corporate political activity was suggested by Citizens 
United’s reliance on “the procedures of corporate democracy” to  correct  political  
distortions  of  the  corporate  form.
22   
This  renewed corporate law commentators’ focus 
on the relationship between campaign spending and corporate governance. In an earlier 
response to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
23 
(the case Citizens United 
overruled), Jill Fisch explained how fiduciary duty law can regulate corporate political 
speech.
24 
First, rules against self-dealing and waste prohibit management from spending 
corporate funds “on political issues that further its political objectives rather than those of 
the corporation.”25 Second, the rule against waste also prohibits management from 
spending corporate funds that do not actually further the corporation’s interests, broadly 
construed.
26 
Third, management “must pursue, as its primary objective, the achievement 
of corporate profits,”27 or in the nonprofit realm, the achievement of the corporation’s 
public mission. Whether political expenditures by business corporations benefits or costs 
shareholders in general is debated,
28  
but the related question as to the fidelity of nonprofit 
corporate management to the corporation’s political ends merits further exploration. 
Nonprofit corporations are far less constrained by market forces than business 
corporations. The attributes that determine a nonprofit corporation, like the nondistribution 
constraint and a requirement of general rather than specific benefit also suggest, as Larry 
Ribstein has explained, “agency costs arguably are even higher in non-profits than in for-
profits.”29 State supervision is necessary because “contributors to charitable-type non-profits 
usually are not merely passive, like public corporations shareholders, but have  no  
governance  rights  at  all.”30   Although  nonprofit  contributors theoretically face lower 
exist costs simply by ending their contributions, “non-profits can exploit their members’ 
moral commitment to the cause, geographical proximity, or social incentives to join, 
and can offer politicians not only money but member votes,”31  even when the political 
outcomes management may achieve do not closely align with the contributors’ 
purposes. Moreover, the close relationships among the fundraisers, political consultants, 
and media firms that surround many major political organizations threaten serious conflicts 
of interest. There is also a version of a potential agency cost that pervades the nonprofit 
sector: management of any organization built around defeating an adversary, whether  
medical,  social,  or  political,  may  have  more  of  an  interest  in sustaining the fight rather 
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than in winning it.
32 
Such problems may argue for stricter enforcement of nonprofit 
corporate fiduciary duties by state officials than business corporate fiduciary duties by 
shareholders. 
These potential conflicts of interest, as well as outright deception by some 
political organizations, also suggest a role for state officials to police political solicitations 
as they police charitable solicitations. Beyond assumed fiduciary duties, contributors to 
political organizations seek the same assurances as donors to other nonprofits that their 
money will be put to use according to the organization’s representations. Where fiduciary 
duty regulates the expenditure of political contributions after the fact, solicitation law 
regulates the solicitation of political contributions before the contributor’s check is written 
(or, increasingly, before the contributor’s text message is sent). Although deception of a 
political contributor seeking to generally positive effect on firm value). fund attack ads to 
defeat an elected official through independent expenditures may make for a less 
sympathetic case than, say, deception of a charitable donor seeking to help victims of a 
natural disaster, it has a similarly corrosive effect on donor confidence. When political 
contributors, especially small donors, cannot trust that their contributions will actually go to 
support their causes, they will be less likely to participate in campaign finance and leave 
the field to large and perhaps less accountable, or more corrupting, financiers. 
 
II. STATE  ENFORCEMENT  OF  POLITICAL  ORGANIZATION  ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Despite the legal norms separating charitable andpolitical organizations, they are all 
fundamentally nonprofit organizations. As Part I argued, their similar attributes give rise to 
similar demands for accountability to the public and to donors. As in charity regulation, 
overlapping federal and state enforcement institutions attempt to meet those demands for 
accountability from political organizations. The failings of some of those institutions to 
provide basic accountability has prompted calls for reform. Most of the proposed reforms 
aim at the federal level and the jurisdictions of the FEC, the IRS, and the FEC. A few 
proposed reforms aim at state campaign finance enforcement. This paper argues that reforms 
should also aim at the relatively underdeveloped jurisdiction of state nonprofit supervision 
over political organizations.  
State nonprofit supervision has similar advantages over federal enforcement in 
regulating political organizations as it has in regulating charities.
33 
First, institutionally, 
nonprofit law enforcers like state attorneys general face more direct incentives toward 
energetic resolution of organizational accountability problems typical of modern campaign 
finance practice, particularly when aggregated across politically diverse states with 
concurrent jurisdiction over nationally active political organizations. This energy and 
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flexibility contrasts with the sclerotic Federal Election Commission and the tightly leashed 
Internal Revenue Service. Lloyd Mayer explains how IRS enforcement of political activity 
“tend to become bogged down,” and the “most politically sensitive cases tend to be the 
ones for which IRS action is most delayed.”34 He compares the nine years it took for the 
IRS to rule on the Christian Coalition’s application for tax-exempt status under section 
501(c)(3), and the additional five years it took for the IRS to litigate the denial of that 
status to a conditional approval, to the seven years it took for the FEC to litigate its case to 
a finding of “only minor violations.”35 The comparison is intended to favor federal 
campaign finance enforcement relative to federal tax enforcement, but both fall far short 
of satisfactory when in the meantime political organizations decide to spend in several 
election cycles without basic accountability under the law. Between the IRS, designed to 
be shackled away from political influence, and the FEC, designed to be paralyzed by it, 
neither should be expected to hold political organizations accountable within the relevant 
electoral timeframes. In contrast, when authorized, state attorneys general can bring 
enforcement actions relatively quickly when the facts warrant it, under their own or a 
client agency’s enforcement powers.36 
Second, constitutionally, nonprofit law is a content-neutral means to ensure 
organizational accountability on generally applicable grounds of fiduciary duty and public 
benefit. This neutrality contrasts with the sometimes self-entrenching or partisan 
tendencies of more targeted legislative  campaign  finance  reforms.  As  Jill  Fisch  argues,  
“traditional corporation law offers a multitude of less intrusive methods for dealing with the 
corrosive effect of corporate speech.”37 The Supreme Court leaves open the avenue of 
traditional corporation law in Citizens United by finding that corporate political speech 
provided “little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders  ‘through the 
procedures of corporate democracy.’”38 Although the Court also holds that a ban on 
corporate expenditures was overinclusive to the extent “it covers all corporations, 
including nonprofit corporations,”39 it does not suggest that corporate democracy has no 
role to play in nonprofit political activities. Another virtue of fiduciary law’s general 
applicability is how that makes it an unsuitable vehicle for political entrenchment. 
Complex campaign finance reform proposals, even at (or especially at) the federal level, 
can conceal loopholes or lines drawn at the wrong place to satisfy politically 
powerfulinterests.
40 
Broad common-law principles embodied in the law governing all 
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nonprofit corporations are less likely to facilitate special treatment to certain political 
organizations. 
Third, politically, governing political organizations as nonprofit corporations 
subject to public benefit and fiduciary duties reinforces important political values  of 
civic  association. The deeply rooted  civic republican emphasis of nonprofit law contrasts 
with the bureaucratic means and ends of modern campaign finance and tax-exempt 
organization laws. To be sure, this advantage is subtler than the practical or doctrinal 
advantages of state nonprofit enforcement. Yet it is worth remembering “the earliest 
forerunners of the modern business corporation were the ecclesiastic and charitable 
organizations … of early England.”41 In the early United States, as Justice Scalia 
explained in Citizens United, “[b]oth corporations and voluntary associations actively 
petitioned the Government and expressed their views in newspapers and pamphlets,”42 in 
what might be the progenitors of modern social welfare organizations that engage in 
politics. If political corruption is understood as the undue influence of factions at the 
expense  of  the  people,  the  conception  of  candidate-associated  political organizations 
may benefit from a closer association of the fiduciary duties they owe their constituents 
as individual donors with the fiduciary duties candidates owe their constituents as 
citizens.
43 
Focusing on the question of whether a political organization meets the broad test 
of “public benefit,” or whether its management’s decisions serve its fiduciary duty of 
loyalty towards its members or donors, may be more productive (if more difficult) 
questions to pose about nonprofit involvement in politics than more technical questions 
under federal tax or campaign finance laws. Putting a political organization’s 
associational structure directly at issue, rather than simply focusing on collateral issues 
of tax exemption or campaign communications, better respects the principles that lead 




The New York Attorney General recently proposed new rules requiring nonprofit 
organizations to report electioneering expenditures.
44 
The effort marks an early example 
of how states might address political organizations through general nonprofit supervision 
authority. According to the Attorney General, The rule aims to, among other things: 
enhance detection and deterrence of illegal conduct by covered organizations and related 
individuals; inform and protect prospective donors to such organizations; protect the 
integrity and reputation of nonprofit organizations that do not intervene in political 
campaigns; maintain the anonymity of donors to covered organizations if their donations 
are restricted to purposes unrelated to influencing elections; protect the public interest in 
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transparent financing of state and local elections; shield donors to covered organizations 
that intervene in political campaigns from public disclosure if it will cause undue harm, 
threats, harassment or reprisal; and ensure that there is clear guidance to covered 
organizations and related individuals concerning compliance.
45
 
The expressed rationale of the rule amounts to a strong statement of the 
alignment between nonprofit supervision and campaign finance regulation. It combines 
public and donor accountability, and protection of apolitical nonprofits’ integrity, in a 
way instantly recognizable to those in the nonprofit sector, and consistent with this paper’s 
discussion. This accountability serves the same ends of encouraging confidence and broad 
participation in the political process as it does in the charitable sector. The means, however, 
may not fully realize the potential of state nonprofit enforcement concerning political 
organizations. The proposed rule mimics electioneering communication disclosure 
requirements at the federal level, though it is limited to organizations already registered 
under state law and the annual filing those organizations must make.
46 
Time will tell 
whether the disclosures will prompt complaints by donors and members, or investigations 
by the Attorney General, about expenditures that breach the organization’s duties to its 
donors or the public. The various institutional, constitutional, and political advantages 
of state enforcement may themselves make this disclosure more effective than the broken 
federal campaign finance system. That is a worthy goal in itself. Yet to the extent the 
disclosure leads to new kinds of enforcement actions arising under the states’ traditional 
powers of nonprofit supervision, it will represent what may be the state attorney 
general’s most distinct and undervalued contribution to a solution of the special 
problems that arise when politics meets the public benefit corporation. 
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